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Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran∗ Siddharth Barman† Nidhi Rathi‡
Abstract
We study classic fair-division problems in a partial information setting. This paper respectively
addresses fair division of rent, cake, and indivisible goods among agents with cardinal preferences.
We will show that, for all of these settings and under appropriate valuations, a fair (or an approxi-
mately fair) division among n agents can be efficiently computed using only the valuations of n − 1
agents. The nth (secretive) agent can make an arbitrary selection after the division has been proposed
and, irrespective of her choice, the computed division will admit an overall fair allocation.
For the rent-division setting we prove that the (well-behaved) utilities of n−1 agents suffice to find
a rent division among n rooms such that, for every possible room selection of the secretive agent, there
exists an allocation (of the remaining n− 1 rooms among the n− 1 agents) which ensures overall envy
freeness (fairness). We complement this existential result by developing a polynomial-time algorithm
that finds such a fair rent division under quasilinear utilities.
In this partial information setting, we also develop efficient algorithms to compute allocations
that are envy-free up to one good (EF1) and ε-approximate envy free. These two notions of fairness are
applicable in the context of indivisible goods and divisible goods (cake cutting), respectively. This
work also addresses fairness in terms of proportionality and maximin shares. Our key result here is an
efficient algorithm that, even with a secretive agent, finds a 1/19-approximatemaximin fair allocation
(of indivisible goods) under submodular valuations of the non-secretive agents.
One of the main technical contributions of this paper is the development of novel connections be-
tween different fair-division paradigms, e.g., we use our existential results for envy-free rent-division
to develop an efficient EF1 algorithm.
1 Introduction
The theory of fair division addresses the fundamental problem of dividing resources/goods in a fair
manner among agents with heterogeneous valuations, but equal entitlements [Mou86]. Many recent re-
sults in algorithmic game theory address computational aspects of fair division, see, e.g., [BCE+16] and
[Rot15] for excellent expositions. A central thread of research here is to design algorithms that comple-
ment nonconstructive existence results. This computational perspective has lead to notable algorithms,
hardness results, and the development of novel solution concepts; in fact, a number of such notions
and algorithms have been integrated into widely-used websites (e.g., Spliddit1 and Adjusted Winner2),
which provide methods for fair division of resources, rent, and tasks. This works contributes to compu-
tational thinking in fair division and, in particular, studies algorithmic aspects of existence results which
show that the preferences of only n− 1 agents suffice to find a fair division among n agents.
Such an existence result for the case of two agents and a divisible good (which is metaphorically
represented as a cake) follows directly from the standard divide-and-choose protocol: considering the
valuation of just the first agent we can partition the cake into two parts of equal value (for the first
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agent) and, then, the second agent can select her most preferred piece. This protocol leads to an envy-free
cake division, i.e., in the resulting allocation no agent has a strictly stronger preference for the other
agent’s piece. Envy freeness is a standard notion of fairness [Fol67, Var74, Str80] and the divide-and-
choose method shows a fair division with respect to this notion can be found even if the second agent is
secretive and just selects a piece after we partition the cake.
Asada et al. [AFP+18] showed that this result extends to higher number of agents who are endowed
with ordinal preferences: there exists a division of the cake into n parts, which depends on the (subjec-
tive) preferences of only n−1 agents, such that the nth (secretive) agent can select an arbitrary piece and
still we would be able to allocate the remaining n− 1 pieces in an envy-free manner. In other words, in-
dependent of the choice of the secretive agent, there exists an allocation in which no agent has a strictly
stronger preference for the piece of any other agent (including the secretive one). This result of Asada et
al. [AFP+18] relies on a fixed-point argument–specifically, it uses a version of the Knaster, Kuratowski,
and Mazurkiewicz (KKM) Lemma [KKM29].
The work of Frick et al. [FHEM17] shows that an envy-free rent division can also be achieved, albeit
inefficiently, in the absence of full information. Rent division is another well-studied problem in the fair-
division literature, and it entails allocating n rooms among n agents and splitting the rent such that envy
freeness is achieved; see, e.g., [Su99], [Sve83], [ADG91], [Ara95], [Kli00] and [GMPZ17]. Considering
agents who have ordinal preferences over the rooms (for every possible division of the rent), Frick et al.
[FHEM17] proved that the preferences of n − 1 agents suffice to find a rent division such that secretive
agent can select an arbitrary room (at its price) and still an overall envy-free allocation of the remaining
n− 1 rooms (at their respective prices and among the n− 1 agents) would exist.
In this paper we will consider agents who have numerical valuations over the good(s) (i.e., have
cardinal preferences) and develop efficient algorithms for secretive fair division in multiple settings.
Specifically, we will study fair division of rent, cake, and indivisible goods. We will show that, under
appropriate valuations, for all of these settings a fair (or an approximately fair) division among n agents
can be efficiently computed using only the valuations of n−1 agents. The nth (secretive) agent can make
an arbitrary selection after the division has been proposed and, irrespective of her choice, the computed
division will continue to admit a fair allocation.
Overall, this work establishes existence and algorithmic results for secretive analogues of standard
fair-division problems.
Fair Rent Division: This problem entails splitting the rent and allocating n rooms among n agents such
that, under the imposed rents, each agent prefers the room allocated to it over that of any other agent.
In the cardinal version of this problem the preferences of the agents for the rooms are expressed via
functions (one for each agent-room pair) which specify agents’ utility for the rooms at every possible
room rent. The works of Svensson [Sve83] and Alkan et al. [ADG91] shows that if the utility functions
of all the n agents for each of the n rooms are continuous, strictly decreasing, and bounded, then an
envy-free rent division is guaranteed to exist. We extend these results and prove that, considering the
utility functions of n − 1 agents,3 we can propose a rent division among the n rooms such that for
every possible room selection of the secretive agent there exists an allocation (of the remaining n − 1
rooms among the n − 1 agents) which ensures overall envy freeness (Theorem 2). Hence, analogous to
the results of [AFP+18] and [FHEM17] (which considered ordinal preferences), we show that fair rent
division with a secretive agent can be achieved in the cardinal setting as well.4
Efficient algorithms for fair rent division are known for the quasilinear utilitymodel [Ara95, GMPZ17,
Kli00]. In this setup every agent a has a base value for each room r, and a’s utility for room r when its
3As in the standard rent-division case, these utilities are assumed to be continuous, strictly decreasing, and bounded.
4The assumptions considered in [AFP+18] and [FHEM17] render these results incomparable with the cardinal setting of
the present paper. In particular, these existence results require that every agent always prefers a zero-rent room over rooms
with positive rent. Since this assumption does not hold even for the class of quasilinear utilities, the ordinal setup of [AFP+18]
and [FHEM17] is incomparable with the cardinal-utility model considered in this work.
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rent is pr is equal to the base value minus pr. We show that, under quasilinear utilities, an efficient,
fair-division algorithm exists even in the secretive case, i.e., we develop a polynomial-time algorithm
for secretive rent division when the utilities of the n− 1 agents are quasilinear (Theorem 3).
Fair Division of Divisible Goods: Cutting a cake (i.e., dividing a divisible good) in a fair manner is
a classic problem in fair division. Formally, the cake is represented as the interval [0, 1] and it models
resources that can be fractionally allocated, such as land. Each agent has a sigma additive valuation over
the subintervals of [0, 1], i.e., over the pieces of the cake. The standard notions of fairness in this context
are (i) envy freeness and (ii) proportionality. We develop results for both of these solution concepts:
(i) Envy Freeness: Simmons (see also [Su99]) has shown that an envy-free partition of the cake among
the n agents is guaranteed to exist. However, no finite-time algorithm can find such a partition if the
valuations are adaptively specified by an adversary [Str08]. Prior work has also considered a variant in
which the cake is divided into more than n pieces and disjoint subsets of the pieces are allocated among
the agents. The best-known algorithm for finding an exact envy-free allocation with noncontiguous
pieces has hyper-exponential complexity [AM16]. To address these computational barriers, one can
consider a natural relaxation of envy freeness wherein for each agent a the value of the piece (or bundle)
assigned to it is within ε of the value of the piece (or bundle) most preferred by a; here, we conform to the
standard assumption that each agent’s valuation for the entire cake is equal to one. Deng et al. [DQS12]
have shown that, for a small enough ε, finding an approximately envy-free contiguous n-partition of the
cake is PPAD-complete under Su’s [Su99] ordinal valuations model.
Given these hardness results, we focus on the problem of dividing the cake into noncontiguous
pieces and allocating bundles to agents such that approximate envy freeness is achieved. We show
that in this framework a secretive division can be obtained efficiently. We consider this problem in the
standard Robertson-Webb query model, and show that the query and time complexity of our algorithm
is polynomial in the number of agents and 1/ε, here ε is the approximation parameter (Theorem 5).
In particular, considering the valuation of only n− 1 agents, we can partition the cake into n disjoint
subsets (each potentially consisting of multiple pieces) such that the secretive agent can select an arbi-
trary subset and we would still be able to allocate the remaining n− 1 subsets in an approximately envy
free manner.
(ii) Proportionality: In the context of cake cutting proportionality is another fundamental fairness crite-
rion. It deems a partition to be fair if each agent receives a piece of value at least 1/n times her value
for the entire cake [Ste48]. Note that additivity of the valuations ensure that an envy free allocation
satisfies proportionality. However, in contrast to envy freeness, a proportional division of the cake can
be efficiently achieved by following the moving-knife procedure of Dubins and Spanier [DS61]: a knife
is moved from one end of the cake (i.e., the interval [0, 1]) to the other and the cake is cut as soon as, for
any agent a (who does not have a piece yet), the value of the piece to the left of the knife is 1/n times the
total value of the cake. This piece is allocated to agent a and she is removed from consideration. The last
agent gets the remainder of the cake. The fact that the agents’ valuations are additive imply that the re-
sulting allocation satisfies proportionality. We show that, interestingly, this moving-knife procedure can
be executed with n− 1 agents to obtain an n-partition which is proportionally fair even with a secretive
agent (Theorem 6).
Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: As mentioned previously, envy-free divisions always exist for di-
visible goods. By contrast, such a universal existential guarantee does not hold in the context of indivis-
ible goods.5 To address this issue and motivated by allocation problems that involve discrete resources
5For example, consider a single indivisible good and two agents with nonzero valuation for the good. In any allocation, the
losing agent will be envious.
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(such as courses at universities [BCKO16]), a number of recent results have formulated and studied fair-
ness notions that specifically address discrete goods [Bud11, PW14, BL16]. Two prominent notions in
this line of work are (i) envy freeness up to one good (EF1) and (ii) maximin shares (MMS). We show
that fairness in terms of these concepts can be achieved even in the presence of a secretive agent.
(i) EF1 is a compelling analogue of envy freeness in the discrete setting [Bud11]. Specifically, an allo-
cation is said to be EF1 if every agent prefers her own bundle over any other agent’s bundle, up to the
removal of one good from the other agent’s bundle. Lipton et al. [LMMS04] proved that if the valu-
ations of the agents (over subsets of goods) are monotone, then an EF1 allocation always exists and
can be computed in polynomial time. The result is notably general, since it encompasses all monotone
(combinatorial) valuations. We prove that, even with a secretive agent, fairness in terms of EF1 can be
guaranteed. In particular, we show that, given n−1 agents with monotone valuations, we can efficiently
partition the set of indivisible goods into n disjoint subsets, S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn}, such that every collec-
tion of n−1 subsets from S can be assigned (among the n−1 agents) to obtain an EF1 allocation overall
(Theorem 4). Note that our result shows that an EF1 allocation exists if n − 1 agents have monotone
valuations; the valuation of the nth agent can be completely arbitrary. Hence, as a corollary, we get a
strengthening of the existence guarantee of Lipton et al. [LMMS04].
(ii) MMS: In the context of indivisible goods, maximin shares lead to another relevant notion of fairness.
These shares provide an agent specific fairness threshold; in particular, the maximin share of an agent
is defined to be the maximum value that the agent can ensure for herself if she were to (hypothetically)
partition the set of indivisible goods into n disjoint subsets and, then, from them receive the minimum
valued one. An allocation is said to satisfy the maximin share guarantee (MMS) if and only if each agent
receives a bundle of value at least as much as her maximin share. Defined by Budish [Bud11], maximin
share can be interpreted through a discrete generalization of the cut-and-choose method: an agent a
partitions (cuts) the goods and the other agents get to select a bundle (choose) before a. A risk-averse
agent awould partition the goods to maximize the minimum valued bundle. Here, the value that a can
ensure for herself corresponds to her maximin share.
Even though MMS allocations are not guaranteed to exist [PW14, KPW16], this notion lends well to
approximations: Procaccia and Wang [PW14] have shown that if the agents have additive valuations,
then there exists an allocation wherein each agent receives a bundle of value at least 2/3 times her max-
imin share; see also [AMNS17] and [BK17]. The work of Ghodsi et al. [GHS+18] provides an efficient
algorithm for finding a 3/4-approximate MMS allocation under additive valuations. Approximation
guarantees for MMS have also been obtained for more general valuation classes [BK17, GHS+18]. In
particular, Ghodsi et al. [GHS+18] show that a 1/3-approximate MMS allocation can be computed effi-
ciently under submodular valuations and a logarithmic approximation exists when the valuations are
subadditive.
We show that, evenwith a secretive agent, if the remaining n−1 agents have submodular valuations,
then a 1/19-approximate MMS allocation for them can be computed in polynomial time. In particular,
we develop a combinatorial algorithm that finds a 1/19-approximate MMS allocation by reducing the
secretive problem to its standard fair-division version. Furthermore, we show that, in the case of in-
divisible goods and additive valuations, a discrete extension of the moving-knife produce provides a
1/2-approximate MMS allocation in the secretive case.
Remark: Note that, when considering envy freeness or EF1with a secretive agent, fairness is guaranteed
for every agent. In particular, the secretive agent can always select its most preferred room/piece/bundle
and achieve envy freeness, irrespective of its valuation type. This property holds in the MMS case as
well, if the valuation of the secretive agent is additive: the secretive agent can select a bundle that en-
sures proportionality for her and, hence, obtain a bundle of value at least as much as her maximin share.
However, in the MMS case such a guarantee cannot be achieved for a secretive agent whose valuation
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is, say, non-additive. This follows from the fact that, considering just the valuations of the n − 1 non-
secretive agents, one cannot determine a partition wherein some bundle is of value (with respect to the
arbitrary valuation of the secretive agent) close to the maximin share of the secretive agent.
Overall, the paper shows that a broad spectrum of fair division problems can be addressed in a
partial information setting. Indeed, with respect to a specific agent, these results prove that a limited
number of valuation queries suffice to find a fair division. Furthermore, our work implies stronger ver-
sions of standard existential and algorithmic results, e.g., the rent-division result developed in the paper
shows that as long as n− 1 agents have quasilinear utilities, an envy-free rent division can be computed
efficiently. Here, the utility function of the nth agent can be arbitrary. This is in contrast to prior works,
which require all the agents to have quasilinear utilities. We obtain these results by developing con-
nections between different fair division paradigms, e.g., we establish the result for EF1 by using the
rent-division guarantees. These connections are mentioned below and they might be of independent
interest.
Our Techniques: We use the generalization of the KKM lemma developed in Asada et al. [AFP+18] to
establish the existence of fair rent division with a secretive agent.
Our efficient algorithm for quasilinear utilities draws upon the equivalence between envy-free rents
and Walrasian equilibria. Specifically, the Second Welfare Theorem for Walrasian equilibrium ensures
that if the n − 1 agents have quasilinear utilities, then every maximum weight matching between the
agents and the rooms induces an envy-free solution; here the weights between agents and rooms are set
to be the corresponding base values. We use this property to formulate a linear program whose solution
is a fair rent division which is robust to the choice of the secretive agent.
Instantiating the result for quasilinear utilities, we show that if n − 1 agents have monotone valu-
ations, then an EF1 allocation (with a secretive agent) always exists and can be computed efficiently.
Specifically, we develop an algorithm that iteratively allocates goods to bundles and maintains the EF1
property as an invariant. We use the rent-division result to show that in each iteration the algorithm can
efficiently find a bundle and allocate the next good to it such that the invariant continues to hold. Note
that, in contrast to the existential result of Lipton et al.—which relies on a direct parity argument—our
work uses a novel connection between rent division and discrete fair division.
The developed EF1 algorithm in turn provides an efficient method to find an approximate envy-free
cake division through a reduction of Lipton et al. [LMMS04]: we partition the cake into pieces such
that, for each of the n− 1 agents, the value of any piece is at most ε. Then, considering these low-valued
pieces as indivisible goods, we execute the EF1 algorithm to obtain an approximately envy-free division
which can accommodate an arbitrary selection by the secretive agent.
We show that a careful analysis of a modified version of the moving knife procedure of Dubins and
Spanier [DS61] guarantees a proportional division of the cake for every eventual choice of the secretive
agent.
To solve the problem of computing approximate MMS allocations in the presence of a secretive agent,
we employ a discretemoving knife procedure on top of existing algorithmic results (that were developed
for the non-secretive setting).
2 Notation and Preliminaries
2.1 Rent Division
Envy-Free Rent Division: An instance of the (standard) envy-free rent division problem is represented
by the following tuple 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a∈A,r∈R 〉whereinA := [n] denotes the set of n agents andR := [n]
denotes the set of n rooms. The cardinal preference of each agent a ∈ A for every room r ∈ R is specified
via a utility function va(r, ·), i.e., a’s utility for r at price (rent) pr ∈ R is va(r, pr) ∈ R.
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A solution to the rent division problem comprises of the tuple (π, p), where π : A 7→ R is a bijec-
tion from the set of agents to the set of rooms and p ∈ Rn is a price vector for the set of rooms. The
tuple (π, p) is said to be an envy-free solution of the given instance if for all a ∈ A and r ∈ R we have
va(π(a), pπ(a)) ≥ va(r, pr), i.e., under the given price vector, no agent strongly prefers (envies) any other
room to the one allocated to her.
Envy-Free Rent Division with a Secretive Agent: A rent-division instance with a secretive agent is a
tuple 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R〉, wherein A = [n] and R = [n] denote the set of n agents and n rooms,
respectively. We will use va(r, ·) to denote the utility function of agent a ∈ A\{n} for room r ∈ R. Here,
in contrast to the standard rent division setting, the problem instances have a distinguished, “secretive”
agent, n, who gets to pick any room of her choice after the prices for the rooms have been proposed.6 A
secretive envy-free solution is a price vector p ∈ Rn that satisfies the following property: for every room
k ∈ R, there exists a bijection πk : A\{n} 7→ R\{k} such that (πk, p) is envy-free, i.e., for all a ∈ A\{n}
and r ∈ R we have va(πk(a), pπk(a)) ≥ va(r, pr).
Intuitively, a price vector p ∈ Rn constitutes a solution in the secretive setting if for any arbitrary
room choice, k ∈ R, of the secretive agent, the properties of p allow us to allocate the remaining rooms
(using πk) among the agents such that no agent strictly prefers any other agent’s room. Note that such
a price vector p is computed before the choice k is made by the secretive agent and without taking into
account any information about her utilities.
We will establish existential results for bounded, continuous, and monotone (strictly) decreasing
utilities. The utility functions {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R are bounded in the sense that there exists M ∈ R+
such that for all agents a ∈ A \ {n} and all pairs of rooms r, r′ ∈ R the following inequality holds.
va(r,M) < va(r
′, 0)
Quasilinear utilities constitute a well-studied subclass of the above-mentioned (broad) class of utility
functions. In the quasilinear setting each utility function va(r, x) is of the form B
a
r − x; here B
a
r ∈ R+
is the base value of room r for agent a. In other words, in the quasilinear case the utility of agent a for
room r is equal to her base value for the room minus the rent of r.
2.2 Envy-Free Allocation of Goods
Secretive EF1 Allocations of Indivisible Goods: An instance of the fair division problem with indi-
visible goods and a secretive agent is a tuple 〈A,G, {va}a∈A\{n}〉 in which A := [n] stands for the set of
n agents, G := [m] denotes the set of m indivisible goods, and vas specify the valuation of each agent
a ∈ A \ {n} over the set of goods. The valuation functions va : 2
G 7→ R+ are assumed to be nonnegative
and monotone for all agents a ∈ A \ {n}.7 Write Πn(G) to denote the set of all n-partitions of G.
In the standard (non-secretive) context with n agents and set of indivisible goods G, an n-partition
A = (A1, . . . , An) ∈ Πn(G) is said to be envy-free up to one good (EF1) iff for all agents a, b there exists a
good g ∈ Ab such that va(Aa) ≥ va(Ab \ {g}); here, each agent a is assigned the subset of goods (bundle)
Aa. Note that the definition ensures that each agent prefers its own bundle over the bundle of any other
agent up to the removal of one good.
This definition extends to address fair division of indivisible goods with a secretive agent. Formally,
an n-partition P = (P1, ..., Pn) ∈ Πn(G) of the set of goods G is said to be a secretive EF1 allocation iff
it satisfies the following property: for each choice of bundle Pk from partition P, there exists a bijection
πk : A \ {n} 7→ [n] \ {k} such that the allocation defined by πk on (P1, . . . , Pk−1, Pk+1, . . . , Pn) is EF1,
i.e., for all a ∈ A \ {n} and all bundles Pb, with b ∈ [n], there exists a good g ∈ Pb such that va(Pπk(a)) ≥
va(Pb \ {g}).
6Note that, here, the instances do not contain any information about the utilities of the (nth) secretive agent.
7Analogous to the rent-division case, the instance tuple contains no information about the valuation function of agent n,
who is designated to be the secretive agent.
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In other words, for every choice of bundle Pk made by the secretive agent, the secretive EF1 solution
P = (P1, P2, ..., Pn) allows for an EF1 allocation of the remaining bundles among the first n− 1 agents.
Secretive Envy-Free Cake Cutting: A cake-cutting instance with a secretive agent comprises of a cake,
represented by the unit interval C = [0, 1], the set of agents, represented by A := [n], and valuations
{va}a∈A\{n}. These valuation functions are defined over all finite unions of disjoint intervals of C . Fol-
lowing standard conventions, the functions are assumed to be nonnegative, normalized (i.e., va(C) = 1)
and sigma additive.8 As is typical in cake cutting, the valuations are also assumed to be divisible,
i.e., for all intervals X ⊆ C and real numbers λ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a subinterval X ′ ⊆ X such that
va(X
′) = λva(X). Here, we use term bundle to denote a finite union of disjoint intervals of the cake. An
n-partition of the cakeA = (A1, . . . , An) is defined to be a tuple of n bundles which are pairwise disjoint
and whose union is equal to C .
Analogous to the previous settings, the valuations are specified only for the first n − 1 agents and
the nth agent is considered to be secretive–no information about her valuation function over the cake is
specified.
In this work we consider the problem of finding an approximately envy-free partition of the cake.
In particular, we say that an allocation is ε-envy free (ε-EF) if, under it the envy is upper bounded
by ε, i.e., an n-partition A = (A1, . . . , An) is ε-EF iff, for all agents a and indices b ∈ [n], we have
va(Aa) ≥ va(Ab)−ε; here, for all agents a, bundleAa is allocated to a. This paper considers cake cutting in
the standard the Robertson-Webb query model [RW98], which provides access to the following (query)
oracles:
1. Cut(a, I, λ): Given agent a, an interval I = [x1, x2] ⊆ C of the cake, and a real number λ ∈ (0, 1] as
a query, the response is a point x ∈ I such that va([x1, x]) = λva(I).
2. Eval(a, I): When queried with an agent a and an interval I = [x1, x2] ⊆ C , this oracle provides a’s
valuation of interval I , i.e., provides va(I).
Extending this concept, a partitionA = (A1, . . . , An) of the cake C is defined to be a secretive ε-EF so-
lution iff for every bundle Ak in the partitionA, there exists a bijection πk : A\{n} 7→ [n] \ {k} such that
the allocation defined by πk on (A1, A2, . . . , Ak−1, Ak+1, . . . , An) is ε-EF, i.e., for all agents a ∈ A \ {n}
and all bundles Ab for b ∈ [n] we have va(Aπk(a)) ≥ va(Ab)− ε.
Note that the secretive agent gets to pick her first choice. Therefore, in all the settings mentioned
above (cake cutting, division of indivisible goods, and rent division), the secretive agent can achieve
envy freeness.
2.3 Proportional Division of Goods
Proportional Cake Division with a Secretive Agent: We also obtain results for cake-cutting with a
secretive agent, in terms of proportionality. Formally, an n-partition A = (A1, A2, ..., An) of the cake
C is said to be a secretive proportional solution iff for every bundle Ak of A, there exists a bijection
πk : A \ {n} 7→ [n] \ {k} such that the allocation defined by πk on (A1, A2, . . . , Ak−1, Ak+1, . . . , An) is
proportional, i.e., for all agents a ∈ A \ {n} we have va(Aπk(a)) ≥ 1/n.
9 For proportional fairness, we
in fact show that there exists a contiguous n-partition that achieves proportional fairness even with a
secretive agent.
MMS Allocation of Indivisible Goodswith a Secretive Agent: Asmentioned in Section 1, the maximin
share property (MMS) provides an analogue of proportionality in the context of indivisible goods. Given
8That is, we have va(X ∪ Y ) = va(X) + va(Y ) for all disjoint pairs of intervals X,Y ⊆ C.
9Recall that the valuations of the first n− 1 agents are normalized to satisfy va(C) = 1.
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a set of indivisible goods G and n agents, the maximin share, µa, of an agent a is defined to be the
maximum value that a can guarantee for herself, if she were to partition G into n subsets and then
receive the minimum valued one. Formally, with va : 2
G 7→ R+ representing the valuation of agent a
over the set of indivisible goods G, we have
µa := max
(A1,...,An)∈Πn(G)
min
j∈[n]
va(Aj) (1)
Since MMS allocations—i.e., allocations in which each agent gets a bundle of value at least as large
as her maximin share—do not always exist, prior work has focused on approximation guarantees. The
goal here is to find a partition (A1, A2, ..., An), wherein each agent a is allocated bundle, Aa, of value
(under va) at least αµa, with parameter α ∈ (0, 1] being as large as possible.
In the presence of a secretive agent, the problem instance formaximin fairness is a tuple 〈A,G, {va}a∈A\{n}〉;
hereA = [n] denotes the set of agents, G = [m] denotes the set of indivisible goods, and the valuation of
each (non-secretive) agent a ∈ A \ {n} is represented by va : 2
G 7→ R+.
An n-partition P = (P1, P2, ..., Pn) ∈ Πn(G) is defined to be a secretive α-MMS solution iff for each
bundle Pk of partition P, there exists a bijection πk : A\ {n} 7→ [n] \ {k} such that the allocation defined
by πk on (P1, P2, . . . , Pk−1, Pk+1, . . . , Pn) gives each agent a ∈ A \ {n} a bundle of value α times her
maximin share, µa , i.e., for all a ∈ A \ {n} the following inequality holds va(Aπk(a)) ≥ αµa .
For (approximate) maximin fairness, the present work focuses on valuations that are monotone,
nonnegative, and submodular. Recall that a function f : 2G 7→ R+ is said to be submodular iff it satisfies
the diminishing marginals property, i.e., for all subsets A,B ⊆ G, with A ⊆ B, and every g ∈ G \ B we
have f(A ∪ {g}) − f(A) ≥ f(B ∪ {g}) − f(B).
2.4 Framework for Secretive Solution Concepts
In all the solution concepts defined above, the bijections/permutations {π1, . . . , πn} (that enable a fair
division after the secretive agent makes a choice) are not an explicit part of the solution. However, for
all settings considered in this work, these permutations can be computed efficiently.
We now provide a useful formalism for secretive solutions. Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) represent a col-
lection of n bundles that constitute a candidate solution of a fair division problem with agents A and
known valuations {va}a∈A\{n}. In this abstract setting, the bundles can be divisible or indivisible goods,
or even a combination of both (e.g., a bundle can represent a room and its rent).
Write H to denote the bipartite graph with the two vertex parts being A \ {n} and {P1, P2, . . . , Pn},
respectively.10 The edge set of H is constructed to account for the underlying fairness property: edge
(a, Pi) is included inH iff bundle Pi satisfies the fairness criterion for agent a. For example, in the context
of rent division—wherein each bundle Pi is a tuple of a room i and its rent pi—edge (a, Pi) is included
iff assigning room i to agent a ensures envy freeness for a, i.e., iff va(i, pi) ≥ va(r, pr) for r ∈ R.
Note that the collection of bundlesP is a secretive solution (satisfying the required fairness criterion)
iff for every k ∈ [n] (i.e., each choice Pk of the secretive agent), there exists a perfect matching πk in
the bipartite graph obtained by removing (vertex) Pk from H. This property leads to the following
characterization: a collection of bundles P is a secretive solution, with respect to the underlying fairness
property, iff for every subset S ⊆ A \ {n} we have |ΓH(S)| ≥ |S| + 1; here ΓH(S) denotes the set of
neighbors of S in the graphH.
The following lemma establishes another useful result regarding the construction of the n permuta-
tions {π1, . . . , πn}. In this result the mapping σ can be thought of as a “backup scheme:” to ensure that
a tuple (P1, . . . , Pn) is a secretive solution is suffices to show that, for each agent a ∈ A \ {n}, both the
bundles Pa and Pσ(a), with σ(a) > a, satisfy the fairness property. The fact that σ(a) > a, for all the first
n − 1 agents, implies that σ induces a topological ordering, i.e., it is acyclic. Intuitively, with mapping
10Note that the two bipartite vertex sets ofH are of size n− 1 and n, respectively.
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σ in hand, we can either given an agent a the bundle Pa or, in case Pa is not available, we can allocate
Pσ(a) to a. The acyclicity of σ ensures that each agent gets a different bundle.
Lemma 1. Given a mapping σ : [n− 1] 7→ [n] \ {1} with the property that σ(a) > a, for all a ∈ [n− 1], we can
efficiently find a set of n bijections B = {πk : [n− 1] 7→ [n] \ {k}}k∈[n] such that for all the bijections π ∈ B and
every a ∈ [n− 1] we have π(a) ∈ {a, σ(a)}, i.e., for each a, permutation π is either the identity or σ.
Proof Consider the directed graph J :=
(
[n], {(i, σ(i))}i∈[n−1]
)
. In J , the nth vertex has no outgoing
edge and the outdegree of every other vertex is exactly equal to one. In addition, the fact that σ(a) > a,
for all a ∈ [n − 1], implies that J is acyclic. Therefore, for each k ∈ [n − 1], there exists a directed path,
Sk, from vertex k to the last vertex n. The required bijection πk is constructed in the following manner:
for all vertices i not on the path Sk we set πk(i) = i and for the remaining vertices set πk(i) = σ(i). ⊓⊔
3 Main Results
The statements of our key results are provided in this section.
Fair Rent Division: The existential and algorithmic results for fair rent division with a secretive agent
are established in Section 4.
Theorem 2. Let I =
〈
A,R, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R
〉
be a rent-division instance with a secretive agent. If the
utilities, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R , of the instance are bounded, continuous, and monotone decreasing, then I admits
a secretive envy-free solution p ∈ Rn.
Theorem 3. Given any rent-division instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R 〉 with a secretive agent and
quasilinear utilities, a secretive envy-free solution p ∈ Rn+ of I can be computed in polynomial time.
Envy Free and EF1 Allocations: In Section 5 we address fairness in terms of envy and prove the fol-
lowing two results.
Theorem 4. Let I = 〈A,G, {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 be a fair division instance with indivisible goods, G, and a secretive
agent. If the valuations {va}a∈A\{n} are nonnegative and monotone (increasing), then a secretive EF1 solution
P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) for I is guaranteed to exist and can be computed in polynomial time.
The computational part of the previous result only requires oracle access to the underlying valua-
tions (set functions) {va}a∈A\{n}.
Theorem 5. For any cake-cutting instance I = 〈A, C = [0, 1], {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 with a secretive agent, a secretive
ε-EF solution P = (P1, . . . , Pn) can be computed in time that is polynomial in n and 1/ε, under the Robertson-
Webb query model.
Proportional and MMS Allocations: Results for proportionality and MMS are developed in Section 6.
Theorem 6. For any cake cutting instance I = 〈A, C = [0, 1], {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 with a secretive agent, a secretive
proportional solution P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) can be computed in polynomial time under the Robertson-Webb query
model. Moreover, we can ensure that the computed bundles, Pis, are intervals, i.e., we can efficiently find a solution
P which forms a contiguous partition of the cake.
Theorem 7. Let I = 〈A,G, {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 be a fair division instance with indivisible goods, G, and a secretive
agent. If the valuations {va}a∈A\{n} are nonnegative, monotone, and submodular, then a secretive 1/19-MMS
allocation P = (P1, P2, ..., Pn) for I is guaranteed to exist and such an approximate MMS allocation can be
computed in polynomial time.
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4 Envy-Free Rent Division
This section presents our results for fair rent division. We show that, for any rent-division instance with
reasonably general utility functions, a secretive envy-free solution is guaranteed to exist. We comple-
ment this existential result by developing an efficient algorithm for computing such solutions for when
the known utilities are quasilinear.
4.1 Existential Result
This subsection considers rent-division instances I = 〈A = [n],R = [n], {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R 〉 with
a secretive agent and utilities, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R , that are bounded, continuous, and monotone de-
creasing. Employing a generalization of the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (KKM) lemma, one can
prove that such rent-division instances always admit a secretive envy-free solution. This form of KKM
lemma appears in the work of Asada et al. [AFP+18], wherein it is used to prove the existence of se-
cretive envy-free solutions under ordinal utilities. As mentioned previously, the result in Asada et al.
[AFP+18] requires assumptions which renders it incomparable with the current (cardinal) setup; in par-
ticular, quasilinear utilities do not fall under the valuation classes considered in Asada et al. [AFP+18].
Recall that for bounded utility functions {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R there exist parameter M ∈ R+ such
that for all agents a ∈ A \ {n} and all pairs of rooms r, r′ ∈ R we have:
va(r,M) < va(r
′, 0) (2)
Write {ei}i∈[n] to denote the standard basis vectors of R
n and let ∆n be the standard simplex in Rn, i.e.,
∆n := conv({ei}i∈[n]).
First we define KKM covers of the simplex and then state the KKM generalization of Asada et al.
[AFP+18].
Definition 8 (KKM Cover). A collection of n closed sets C1, C2, ..., Cn ⊂ R
n is said to form a KKM cover of
the simplex ∆n, if and only if for all I ⊆ [n], the convex hull of the basis vectors corresponding to I is covered by⋃
i∈I Ci, i.e., iff for all I ⊆ [n], we have conv ({ei}i∈I) ⊆
⋃
i∈I Ci.
The following lemma, proved in [AFP+18], provides a useful property of any (n− 1) KKM covers of
∆n. The lemma states that for every index k ∈ [n], it is possible to pick one set from each of the (n − 1)
KKM covers such that no two sets have the same index and the index k is not used, with the property
that the intersection of these selected sets is non empty.
Lemma 9 ([AFP+18]). Given (n − 1) KKM Covers C1, C2, . . . , Cn−1 (here each Ci = {Ci1, C
i
2, . . . , C
i
n} is a
collection of n sets) of the standard simplex∆n, there exists a point x ∈ ∆n and n bijections πk : [n−1] 7→ [n]\{k}
with 1 ≤ k ≤ [n] such that x ∈
⋂
i∈[n−1]C
i
πk(i)
.
To apply this lemmawewill map points in the simplex to room rents (price vectors). Such amapping
enables us to construct KKM covers from the utilities of the first n − 1 agents. Specifically, we define a
function h(z) := M(1−nz), whereM ∈ R+ is a large enough real number that satisfies the boundedness
condition (2) for the given rent-division instance. Given a simplex point x ∈ ∆n, we apply h component-
wise to generate the price (rent) of each room, i.e., price vector p is generated from x by setting pr :=
h(xr) for all r ∈ [n]. Note that h(0) = M and h(z) ≤ 0 for all z ≥ 1/n.
For each agent a ∈ A \ {n}, we define a collection of sets Ca = {Ca1 , C
a
2 , ..., C
a
n} such that the set C
a
r
consists of all the simplex points whose corresponding prices render room r as a “first choice” of agent
a. Formally,
Car := {x ∈ ∆
n | va(r, h(xr)) ≥ va(s, h(xs)) for all s ∈ R}. (3)
The following claim establishes that each agent’s collection of sets forms a KKM cover.
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Claim 1. For each agent a ∈ A \ {n}, the set Ca = {Ca1 , . . . , C
a
n} (as defined above) is a KKM cover of the
simplex ∆n.
Proof Since the valuation functions are continuous, using the sequential criteria for continuity, we get
that the sets in the collection Ca are closed.
Now, consider any subset I ⊆ [n] and any point x ∈ conv({ei}i∈I), where eis denote the standard
basis vectors of Rn (these vectors are also the vertices of the simplex ∆n). To prove that Ca is a KKM
cover, it suffices to prove that there exists r ∈ I such that x is contained in the set Car .
Write p ∈ Rn+ to denote the price vector obtained by (component-wise) applying function h on x.
Note that, for all r′ ∈ [n] \ I , we have xr′ = 0. Hence, the definition of h gives us pr′ = M for all
r′ ∈ [n] \ I . On the other hand, an averaging argument implies that there exists a component, ρ ∈ I , of
x such that xρ ≥ 1/n and, hence, pρ ≤ 0. Therefore, using the definition of M (see inequality (2)) and
the monotonicity of va(r, ·)s, we get that va(r
′, pr′) < va(ρ, pρ) for all r
′ ∈ [n] \ I . In other words, at price
vector p, none of the rooms r′ ∈ [n] \ I is a first choice of agent a, ([n] \ I) ∩ (argmaxr va(r, pr)) = ∅.
Hence, at price vector p, a first-choice room, say r, must be from the set I . Overall, this ensures that
x ∈ Car , for some r ∈ I , and the claim follows.
⊓⊔
With the (n − 1) KKM covers (one for each agent a ∈ A \ {n}) in hand, we apply Lemma 9 to find a
secretive envy-free solution.
Theorem 2. Let I =
〈
A,R, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R
〉
be a rent-division instance with a secretive agent. If the
utilities, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R , of the instance are bounded, continuous, and monotone decreasing, then I admits
a secretive envy-free solution p ∈ Rn.
Proof Consider the (n − 1) KKM covers, C1, . . . , Cn−1 (obtained via Equation (3)) corresponding to
the valuation functions {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R . Lemma 9 ensures that there exists a point x
∗ ∈ ∆n and n
bijections πk : [n − 1] 7→ [n] \ {k}, with 1 ≤ k ≤ n, such that x
∗ ∈
⋂
i∈[n−1]C
i
πk(i)
. We will show that the
price vector, p∗, obtained by componentwise applying function h on x∗ is a secretive envy-free solution.
Say, under price vector p∗, the secretive agent selects room k ∈ [n]. Then, the property of the bijection
πk : [n − 1] 7→ [n] \ {k} gives us x
∗ ∈
⋂
i∈[n−1]C
i
πk(i)
, i.e., for all agents a ∈ A \ {n} = [n − 1], the point
x∗ is contained in the set Ca
πk(a)
. The definition of KKM covers (see Equation (3)) implies that the room
πk(a) is a first choice of each agent a ∈ A \ {n}.
Therefore, for any k ∈ R = [n], the allocation (πk, p
∗) provides an envy-free solution. Overall, we get
that p∗ is a secretive envy-free solution of the rent-division instance. ⊓⊔
4.2 Algorithmic Result for Quasilinear Utilities
Efficient algorithms for finding envy-free rent divisions (in the standard, non-secretive setting) have
been developed in prior work under quasilinear utilities [Ara95, GMPZ17, Kli00]. In this utility model
each function va(r, pr) is of the form B
a
r − pr, i.e., agent a’s utility for room r when its rent is pr is equal
to the base value, Bar , minus pr. Note that Theorem 2 applies to quasilinear utilities, since they are a
subclass of bounded, continuous, and monotone decreasing utilities.
For a given rent-division instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r〉 with a secretive agent and quasilin-
ear utilities, throughout this subsection we will use H = ((A \ {n}) ∪ R, (A \ {n}) × R) to denote the
complete, weighted bipartite graph (between agents and rooms) in which weight of each edge (a, r) is
equal to the base valueBar . Also, writeH
k to denote the weighted, bipartite graph obtained by removing
the kth vertex from the rooms’ side in H.
Extending this notation, we will useH to denote the analogous bipartite graph in the standard (non-
secretive) rent-division context. Note that, in H, the two vertex sides are of size n, each, and the edges
indecent on the nth vertex of the agents’ side have weights Bnr for r ∈ R.
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Next, using the above mentioned notation, we state the secondwelfare theorem. This result provides
an important characterization of envy-free rent divisions in the standard (i.e., non-secretive) quasilinear
setting.
Lemma 10 (SecondWelfare Theorem;Mas-Colell et al. ([MCWG95, Chapter 16])). Let I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a,r〉
be a rent-division instance with quasilinear utilities (i.e., va(r, x) = B
a
r − x for all a ∈ A and r ∈ R). Then,
if (π, p) is an envy free solution of I and σ is a maximum-weight perfect matching in H, then (σ, p) is also an
envy-free solution of the instance. Furthermore, every agent receives the same utility under both the solutions.
The subsequent lemma provides an analogue of the second fundamental theorem for the secretive
context. The lemma shows that if πk is a maximumweight matching in bipartite graphH
k, for all k ∈ [n],
then for any secretive envy-free solution p∗ and any (room) choice k of the secretive agent, one can use πk
to find an allocation that achieves envy freeness overall. In other words, maximum-weight matchings
of bipartite graphsHks suffice to certify that p∗ is indeed a secretive envy-free solution.
We use this result to establish the correctness of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Secretive Envy-Free Rent Division Under Quasilinear Utilities
Input: A rent division instance 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R 〉with a secretive agent and quasilinear utili-
ties {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n} (i.e., va(r, x) = B
a
r − x for all a ∈ A \ {n} and all r).
Output: A secretive envy-free solution p∗ ∈ R+n and n bijections {πk}k∈R such that for each
k, the bijection πk : A \ {n} 7→ R \ {k} along with p
∗ provides an envy-free solution.
1: For all k ∈ R, set πk to be a maximum-weight perfect matching in the bipartite graphH
k.
2: Set p∗ ∈ Rn+ to be the solution of the following linear program
{The goal here is to find a single price vector under which each πk is an envy-free allocation}
min
x∈Rn
∑
r∈[n]
xr
subject to xr ≥ 0 for all r ∈ [n]
Baπk(a) − xπk(a) ≥ B
a
r − xr for all a ∈ A \ {n} and all k, r ∈ R
3: return price vector p∗ and the n bijections {πk}k∈R.
Lemma 11. Let I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r〉 be a rent-division instance with a secretive agent and quasilinear
utilities (i.e., va(r, x) = B
a
r −x for all a ∈ A\{n} and r ∈ R). In addition, for all k ∈ [n], let πk be a maximum-
weight perfect matching in the bipartite graph Hk and p∗ ∈ Rn+ be any secretive envy-free solution (price vector)
of I . Then, (πk, p
∗)—for all k ∈ [n]—is an envy-free solution of I , i.e., va(πk(a), pπk(a)) ≥ va(r, pr) for all
k ∈ [n], a ∈ A \ {n} and r ∈ R.
Proof Theorem 2 implies that instance the I (with quasilinear utilities) admits a secretive envy-free so-
lution p∗. Therefore, by definition of a secretive solution, there exist n bijections, φ1, φ2, . . . , φn, that pro-
vide that an envy-free allocation for every possible choice (room selection) of the secretive agent. Specif-
ically, for every choice k ∈ R, all agents a ∈ A \ {n}, and all rooms r ∈ R we have va(φk(a), pφk(a)) ≥
va(r, pr).
For all k ∈ R, write pk ∈ Rn−1 to denote the restriction of the price vector p to the rooms R \ {k}.
Note that (φk, p
k) is an envy-free solution of the (non-secretive) rent-division instance Ik = 〈A \ {n} =
[n− 1],R \ {k}, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R\{k}〉.
Given that all the utilities in Ik are quasilinear, we can apply the Second Welfare Theorem (Lemma
10) to obtain that (πk, p
k) is also an envy-free solution of this instance; recall that πk is amaximum-weight
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matching in Hk. In addition, Lemma 10 guarantees that agent a obtains the same utility under both the
solutions (φk, p
k) and (πk, p
k), i.e., va(φk(a), pφk(a)) = va(πk(a), pπk(a)). Therefore, va(πk(a), pπk(a)) ≥
va(r, pr) for all rooms r ∈ R.
In other words, the bijections {πk}k∈R also provide an envy-free allocation for every possible choice
of the secretive agent and satisfy the required inequality va(πk(a), pπk(a)) ≥ va(r, pr) for all k ∈ [n],
a ∈ A \ {n} and r ∈ R. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3 states the correctness and time complexity of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3. Given any rent-division instance I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R 〉 with a secretive agent and
quasilinear utilities, a secretive envy-free solution p ∈ Rn+ of I can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof Theorem 2 ensures that the given instance I admits a secretive envy-free solution p ∈ Rn. We
can assume that p is componentwise nonnegative–uniform, additive shifts of a price vector maintain
envy freeness under quasilinear utilities. In addition, using Lemma 11, for each πk (a maximum-weight
matching in Hk) we have va(πk(a), pπk(a)) ≥ va(r, pr), i.e., πks provide envy-free allocations for every
choice k of the secretive agent.
Therefore, p certifies the feasibility of the linear program (LP) formulated in Algorithm 1. Since this
LP is also bounded, the algorithmwill necessarily find a price vector p∗ which (paired with the bijections
{πk}k∈R) explicitly satisfies the definition of a secretive envy-free solution. This proves the correctness
of Algorithm 1. Finally, note that Algorithm 1 entails finding nmaximum-weight matchings and solving
a linear program with a polynomial number of variables and constraints. Hence, the algorithm runs in
polynomial time and the stated claim follows.
⊓⊔
We conclude this section by stating and proving a combinatorial lemma, which will be essential in
establishing the EF1 results. The lemma asserts that for with respect to maximum weight matchings πks
(in graphs Hks) there will always be a room that is “universally despised” by all the agents and across
all the n bijections πks.
Lemma 12. Let I = 〈A,R, {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r〉 be a rent-division instance with a secretive agent and quasilinear
utilities (i.e., va(r, x) = B
a
r − x for all a ∈ A \ {n} and r ∈ R). In addition, for all k ∈ [n], let πk be a
maximum weight perfect matching in the bipartite graph Hk. Then, there always exists a room ρ ∈ [n] such that
Ba
πk(a)
≥ Baρ , for all agents a ∈ A \ {n} and all bijections πk, with k ∈ [n].
Proof Write p to denote a secretive envy-free solution of the quasilinear instance I ; we know that
such a price vector exists via Theorem 2. Consider a room ρ ∈ R with the smallest rent under p: ρ ∈
argminr∈R pr. Since p is a secretive envy-free solution, for any choice k ∈ R of the secretive agent, πk
provides an envy-free allocation (Lemma 11). In particular, at the imposed prices, no agent a strongly
prefers room ρ to the room allocated to her, i.e., to πk(a). Therefore,
va(πk(a), pπk(a)) ≥ va(ρ, pρ) ((πk, p) is an envy-free solution)
Baπk(a) − pπk(a) ≥ B
a
ρ − pρ (utilities are quasilinear)
Baπk(a) ≥ B
a
ρ (since pρ ≤ pπk(a))
⊓⊔
5 Envy-Free Division with a Secretive Agent
In Section 5.1, we address indivisible goods and show that a secretive EF1 allocation always exists
and can be computed efficiently, as long as the valuations of the non-secretive agents are monotone
increasing.
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Section 5.2 provides results for divisible goods (i.e., cake cutting). In particular, we reduce the prob-
lem of finding a secretive ε-EF solution (in the cake-cutting setup) to that of computing a secretive EF1
allocation (over indivisible goods). Therefore, using the results developed in Section 5.1, we obtain
existential and algorithmic results for secretive ε-EF division.
5.1 Secretive EF1 Allocations of Indivisible Goods
We begin by stating notation which will be required for detailing the algorithm that efficiently finds a se-
cretiveEF1 allocation (Algorithm 2). Consider a fair division instance I = 〈A = [n],G = [m], {va}a∈A\{n} 〉
with a secretive agent and indivisible goods G. Let P = (P1, P2, ...Pn) be an n-partition of a subset of
goods G′ ⊆ G; we will refer to such an n-partition P as a partial allocation. Note that G′ = ∪iPi.
Given any partial allocation P, write HP := ((A \ {n}) ∪ {Pi}i, (A \ {n})× {Pi}i) to denote the
weighted, bipartite graph whose bipartition is composed of the set of agents A \ {n} and the bundles
{P1, . . . Pn}. Here, an edge (a, Pi) ∈ (A \ {n})×{P1, . . . , Pn} is said to be satisfy the EF1 property iff for
all bundles Pj in P there exists a good g ∈ Pj such that va(Pi) ≥ va(Pj \ {g}).
Write EP to denote the set of edges that satisfy theEF1 property and E
c
P to denote the set of edges that
do not, EcP = ((A \ {n})× {Pi}i) \ EP . InHP , the weight of each edge (a, Pi) that satisfies the EF1 prop-
erty is set to be va(Pi) and all edges (b, Pj) ∈ E
c
P are assigned a weight equal to −m
(
maxa∈A\{n} va(G)
)
,
wherem is the total number of goods.
Finally, we will useHkP to denote the bipartite graph obtained by removing vertex Pk from the graph
HP . Note that the partition P is a secretive EF1 allocation if and only if, for every possible (choice of
the secretive agent) k ∈ [n], there exists a perfect matching πk in H
k
P that contains only EF1 edges, i.e.,
satisfies πk ⊆ EP .
11 Here, the choice of edge weights ensures that if there is a perfect matching in HkP
consisting solely of EF1 edges, then any maximum weight matching will also be composed entirely of
EF1 edges.
Next, we will use these constructs to describe Algorithm 2 and prove its correctness in Theorem 4.
A key argument in the proof is an application of Lemma 13 to show that Step 5 of Algorithm 2 always
succeeds. In particular, Lemma 13 guarantees the existence of a “universally-despised” bundle.
Algorithm 2 Computation of Secretive EF1 Allocations
Input: A fair division instance I = 〈A,G, {va}a∈A\{n} 〉with a secretive agent,m indivisible goods along
with nonnegative and monotone valuations (set functions) va : 2
[m] → R+ for agents a ∈ A \ {n}
Output: An allocation (P1, . . . , Pn) and n bijections {πk}k∈[n] such that, for each choice k of the secretive
agent, πk : A \ {n} 7→ [n] \ {k} induces an EF1 allocation.
1: Initialize t← 0 and set P ta = ∅ for 1 ≤ a ≤ n, i.e., partial allocation P
0 = (∅, . . . , ∅).
2: while G 6= ∅ do
3: For partial allocation Pt = (P t1 , . . . , P
t
n), construct the bipartite graphHPt
4: For each k ∈ [n], set πk to be a maximum-weight perfect matching in the graph H
k
Pt (i.e., in the
graph HPt with vertex P
t
k removed).
5: Find a bundle P tρ such that for all k ∈ [n] and all a ∈ A\{n}we have va(P
t
πk(a)
) ≥ va(P
t
ρ) {Wewill
prove that such a “universally-despised” bundle always exists and can be found efficiently}
6: Select an arbitrary good g ∈ G and set P t+1ρ = P
t
ρ ∪ {g}
7: For all i ∈ [n] \ {ρ} set P t+1i = P
t
i . Update t← t+ 1 and G ← G \ {g}
8: end while
9: return Partition P t = (P t1 , P
t
2 , ..., P
t
n) and the n bijections {πk}k∈[n]
11Here, for ease of presentation, we overload notation and use pik to represent both a bijection and a matching (subset of
edges).
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Lemma 13. LetP = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a partial allocation of the indivisible goods in an instance I = 〈A,G, {va}a∈A\{n} 〉
and let πk be a maximin weight perfect matching in the bipartite graph H
k
P , for each k ∈ [n]. If the match-
ing πks are composed entirely of EF1 edges (πk ⊆ EP ), then there exists an index (bundle) ρ ∈ [n] such that
va(Pπk(a)) ≥ va(Pρ) for all a ∈ A \ {n} and all k ∈ [n].
Proof From the given instance I and partial allocation P = (P1, . . . , Pn), we construct a rent-division
instance Î = 〈A,R = [n], {va(r, ·)}a∈A\{n},r∈R〉 in which the ith room corresponds to the ith bundle
Pi. The utilities in Î are set to be quasilinear, va(i, z) := B
a
i − z. Here, B
a
i (the base value of room
i for agent a) is assigned to the weight of the edge (a, Pi) in the bipartite graph HP . That is, if edge
(a, Pi) satisfies the EF1 property then B
a
i = va(Pi). Otherwise, if (b, Pj) is not an EF1 edge, then B
b
j =
−m
(
maxa∈A\{n} va(G)
)
.
An application of Lemma 12 over rent-division instance Î shows that there exists a room ρ ∈ [n] such
that—for all agents a ∈ A \ {n} and maximum weight matchings πk—we have B
a
πk(a)
≥ Baρ .
12
Using the fact that every edge in the matching πk is an EF1 edge, we get B
a
πk(a)
= va(Pπk(a)) for all
agents a ∈ A \ {n}.
Now, if for an agent a edge (a, Pρ) satisfies the EF1 property then B
a
ρ = va(Pρ) and we get the
desired inequality va(Pπk(a)) ≥ va(Pρ). Otherwise, if edge (a, Pρ) is not an EF1 edge, then there must
exist a bundle Pj such that for all g
′ ∈ Pj the inequality va(Pρ) < va(Pj \ {g
′}) holds. Again, using the
fact that (a, Pπk(a)) is an EF1 edge, we get that there exists g˜ ∈ Pj for which va(Pπk(a)) ≥ va(Pj \ {g˜}).
Hence, the desired inequality va(Pπk(a)) ≥ va(Pρ) holds in all cases. ⊓⊔
Theorem 4. Let I = 〈A,G, {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 be a fair division instance with indivisible goods, G, and a secretive
agent. If the valuations {va}a∈A\{n} are nonnegative and monotone (increasing), then a secretive EF1 solution
P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) for I is guaranteed to exist and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof We will use an inductive argument to establish the correctness of Algorithm 2. Write Pt to
denote the partial allocation considered by Algorithm 2 in the tth iteration of the while-loop. We will
show that the maximum-weight matching matchings computed by algorithm during any iteration t, say
πks, satisfy πk ⊆ EPt , i.e., in all iterations, the computed matchings are composed entirely of EF1 edges.
In conjunction, we will prove that there exits a bundle P tρ such that the inequality va(P
t
πk(a)
) ≥ va(P
t
ρ)
holds for all agents a ∈ A \ {n} and all matchings πk.
Both of these conditions hold when t = 0, since P 0i = ∅ for all i ∈ [n]. This gives us the base case for
induction. Now, say—via the induction hypothesis—that the conditions hold for the (t− 1)th iteration.
In particular, if π̂ks are the maximum-weight matchings considered in the (t − 1)th iteration, then we
have π̂k ⊆ EPt−1 and va(P
t−1
π̂k(a)
) ≥ va(P
t−1
ρ̂
) for some room ρ̂.
By construction, P tρ̂ = P
t−1
ρ̂
∪ {g} and P ti = P
t−1
i for all i 6= ρ̂. Note that, even after this update, the
edges in matchings π̂ks continue to satisfy the EF1 property: if (a, P
t−1
i ) is an edge in π̂k (i.e., i = π̂k(a)),
then va(P
t−1
i ) ≥ va(P
t−1
ρ̂
). Therefore, va(P
t
i ) ≥ va(P
t
ρ̂ \ {g}). Since no other bundle receives a good, the
ith bundle satisfies the EF1 property for a in the new partial allocation Pt = (P t1 , . . . , P
t
n) as well.
This implies that there exists a perfect matching in the bipartite graph HkPt (specifically, π̂k) which
is entirely composed on EF1 edges. The weight of all the edges in EcPt is low (negative) enough to
ensure that if HkPt admits a perfect matching composed entirely of EF1 edges, then a maximum-weight
matching, πk, in H
k
Pt will satisfy πk ⊆ EPt .
Furthermore, Lemma 13 (applied to Pt) implies that there exists a bundle P tρ which satisfies the
desired inequalities va(P
t
πk(a)
) ≥ va(P
t
ρ). This concludes the inductive argument and shows that Step 5
will necessarily succeed in finding bundle P tρ. Also, note that with matchings πks in hand, an exhaustive
search can be performed to efficiently find P tρ. Hence, the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
12By construction of Î , the bipartite graphHk considered in Lemma 12 is identical to HkP . Hence, we can apply the lemma
to piks, the maximum wight perfect matchings ofH
k
Ps.
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Note that if P is the final partition and πks are the corresponding (returned) matchings, then we
know that πks are composed entirely of EF1 (with respect to bundles in P) edges. Therefore, P is a
secretive EF1 allocation and the claim follows. ⊓⊔
5.2 Secretive ε-EF Cake Cutting
In this subsection, we present an algorithm to find a secretive ε-EF solutions of cake-cutting instances.
This algorithm is based on a reduction of Lipton et. al. [LMMS04], which transforms the problem of
(approximately) envy free cake-cutting to that of finding a secretive EF1 allocation of indivisible goods.
Theorem 5. For any cake-cutting instance I = 〈A, C = [0, 1], {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 with a secretive agent, a secretive
ε-EF solution P = (P1, . . . , Pn) can be computed in time that is polynomial in n and 1/ε, under the Robertson-
Webb query model.
Proof We query the agents’ valuations to divide the cake into continuous pieces such that each piece
is of value at most ε for any agent in A \ {n}. As the valuation functions are additive, there are at most
n/ε such pieces. Considering these pieces as indivisible goods, we find a secretive EF1 allocation P
using Theorem 4. Note that the envy in such an allocation is upper bounded by the largest value for a
single piece, which is at most ε. Therefore, P is a secretive ε-EF solution of instance given cake-cutting
instance I . ⊓⊔
6 Proportional and Maximin Fair Division with a Secretive Agent
This section considers two settings: proportional division of a cake (a divisible good) and maximin fair
division of indivisible goods. In both of these cases we show that, even in presence of a secretive agent,
we can establish existential and algorithmic results that are essentially similar to ones obtained in the
standard (non-secretive) settings.
6.1 Proportional Cake Cutting with a Secretive Agent
This subsection presents a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a secretive proportional solution
of a given cake; the definition of this solution concept appears in Section 2. In particular, we show that
the Dubins-Spanier moving knife procedure [DS61] when executed among the first n − 1 agents, with
threshold set to 1/n, finds such a solution.
Theorem 6. For any cake cutting instance I = 〈A, C = [0, 1], {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 with a secretive agent, a secretive
proportional solution P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) can be computed in polynomial time under the Robertson-Webb query
model. Moreover, we can ensure that the computed bundles, Pis, are intervals, i.e., we can efficiently find a solution
P which forms a contiguous partition of the cake.
Proof The Dubins-Spanier moving knife procedure can be executed in polynomial time under the
Robertson-Webb query model. Specifically, for each agent a ∈ A \ {n}, we query Cut(a, [0, 1], 1/n) and
select an agent a1 with the (inclusion wise) smallest cut, i.e., agent a1 = argmina∈A\{n} Cut(a, [0, 1], 1/n)
makes the first cut on the cake. We continue the same procedure over the remaining cake—with agent
a1 removed consideration—until each of the n − 1 agents makes a cut. The fact that the agents’ valua-
tions are additive implies that every agent will end up making a cut. Also, note that at the end of the
procedure the cake gets partitioned into exactly n pieces.
We reindex the agents based on the order in which they made a cut. That is, agent i ∈ [n − 1]makes
a cut in the ith round and reserves, say, the piece Pi. The procedure ensures that vi(Pi) = 1/n for each
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i.13 Write Pn to denote the last (leftover) piece. In addition, note that the procedure ensures that for any
agent i ∈ [n − 1] the proportional value is not exceeded by any piece with a lower index, vi(Pk) ≤ 1/n
for all k < i.
Hence, for each iwe have
∑
k:k>i vi(Pk) ≥ 1− 1/n − (i − 1)/n = (n− i)/n. An averaging argument
guarantees the existence of a piece Pj such that j > i and vi(Pj) ≥ 1/n. We select an index j that satisfies
this inequality and set σ(i) = j. The mapping σ can be thought of as a backup-allocation scheme: for
every agent i, both the pieces Pi and Pσ(i) guarantee a proportional share. Since σ(i) > i for each agent
i ∈ [n − 1], using Lemma 1, we can construct n bijections {πk}k∈[n] that guarantee a proportional share
for every possible choice Pk of the secretive agent. In other words, the computed partition (P1, . . . , Pn)
is a secretive proportional solution. This completes the proof of the theorem. ⊓⊔
6.2 MMS Allocation of Indivisible Goods with a Secretive Agent
This subsection presents a polynomial-time algorithm (Algorithm 3) for computing secretive (approxi-
mate) MMS allocations under monotone, submodular valuations.
For a monotone increasing, submodular valuation v : 2G 7→ R+, over the set of indivisible goods G,
we define a thresholding procedure to obtain a surrogate valuation (set function) v̂ : 2G 7→ R+ whose
marginals are upper bounded. The function v̂ will continue to be monotone and submodular, and this
construct will be used in Algorithm 3. Formally, given threshold κ > 0, a specific good ĝ ∈ G, and a
monotone, submodular valuation v : 2G 7→ R+ we define a set function v̂ : 2
G 7→ R+ as follows
v̂(S) :=
{
v(S) if ĝ /∈ S
v(S \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vS\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
else, if ĝ ∈ S
(4)
Here vS\{ĝ}(ĝ) denotes the marginal value of good ĝ with respect to the set S \ {ĝ}, i.e., vS\{ĝ}(ĝ) =
v(S ∪ {ĝ}) − v(S \ {ĝ}). The next lemma provides relevant properties of v̂ and its proof appears in
Appendix B.
Lemma 14. Let v : 2G 7→ R+ be a monotone increasing, nonnegative, submodular valuation function over a set
of indivisible goods G. If for a parameter κ > 0, there exists exactly one good ĝ ∈ G such that v({ĝ}) ≥ κ, then
the valuation function v̂ : 2G 7→ R+, obtained using Equation (4) with good ĝ and threshold κ, is also monotone
increasing, nonnegative, and submodular.
Given fair division instance I = 〈A,G, {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 with a secretive agent, indivisible goods G =
[m], and monotone, submodular valuations va : 2
G 7→ R+, write µa to denote the maximin share of
agent a (see equation (1)). In addition, let µ̂a denote the maximin share of agent a under the surrogate
valuation v̂a, i.e., µ̂a := max(A1,...,An)∈Πn(G)minj∈[n] v̂a(Aj).
Lemma 15 asserts that µ̂a is close to µa, for an appropriate κ.
Lemma 15. For a set of indivisible goods G, let va : 2
G 7→ R+ be the monotone, submodular valuation of agent
a and τ ≤ µa be a parameter such that there exists exactly one good ĝ of value above τ/19, va({ĝ}) ≥ τ/19.
Furthermore, let v̂ : 2G 7→ R+ be the surrogate of va obtained using (4) with good ĝ and κ = τ/19. Then, we
have µ̂a ≥
9
19µa.
Remark: The maximin share of an agent a is not known a priori.14 The fact that Lemma 15 holds for
τ—a conservative estimate of µa—enables us to obtain the approximation guarantee without having to
compute µa.
13Recall that the valuations are normalized to satisfy va([0, 1]) = 1 for all a ∈ A \ {n}.
14In fact, computing µa is an NP-hard problem even under additive valuations–the partition problem reduces to it.
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Algorithm 3 Computation of Approximate Secretive MMS Allocations
Input: An instance I = 〈A = [n],G = [m], {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 and thresholds τa for each a ∈ A \ {n}. The
nonnegative, monotone, submodular valuations, vas, are specified via an oracle.
Output: An allocation (P1, . . . , Pn) and a mapping σ : [n − 1] 7→ [n] such that, for all a ∈ A \ {n}, we
have va(Pa) ≥ τa/19, va(Pσ(a)) ≥ τa/19, and σ(a) > a.
1: Initialize set of agents A = [n− 1] and set of goodsG = [m].
2: while there exist agent a ∈ A and goods g, g′ ∈ G such that va(g) ≥
τa
19 and va(g
′) ≥ τa19 do
3: Allocate Pa ← {g}, and update A← A \ {a} and G← G \ {g}.
4: end while
{At this point, for each agent a ∈ A there is at most one good g ∈ Gwhich satisfies va(g) ≥
τa
19}
5: Set A′ = {a ∈ A | there exists ga ∈ Gwith va(ga) ≥
τa
19}.
6: For set of goods G and each a ∈ A′, obtain v̂a : 2
G 7→ R+ by applying (4) with ĝ = ga and κ =
τa
19
7: For each a ∈ A \ A′, set v̂a = va
{In the subsequent steps we only require oracle access to v̂a restricted to G}
8: Find a 1/3-MMS allocation (Q1, Q2, . . . , Q|A|) for the the instance 〈A,G, {v̂a}a∈A〉 . {This can be
accomplished using the polynomial-time algorithm from [GHS+18]}
9: if for an agent a ∈ Awe have va(Qa) <
3
19τa then
10: Flag agent a and exit. {We will show that this condition is executed only if τa > µa.}
11: end if
12: For each a ∈ A, partition each Qa into two subsets Q
′
a and Qa \ Q
′
a such that v̂a(Q
′
a) ≥
1
19τa and
v̂a(Qa \Q
′
a) ≥
1
19τa.
13: For all a ∈ A, set Pa = Q
′
a
14: Set Pn = ∪a∈A (Qa \Q
′
a) and σ(a) = n for all a ∈ A.
15: Recall that for each a ∈ [n− 1] \A, there exists g′ ∈ G \Pa such that va(g
′) ≥ 119τa. If g
′ ∈ Pn, then set
σ(a) = n. Else, if g′ ∈ Pa′ for a
′ ∈ A, then set σ(a) = a′.
16: return partition P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) and mapping σ.
Proof Write P∗ = {P ∗1 , . . . , P
∗
n} to denote an n-partition of the indivisible goods G that realizes the
maximin share of agent a; µa = minj va(P
∗
j ). From P
∗, we will create another partition P ′ = (P ′1, . . . , P
′
n)
which satisfies v̂a(P
′
i ) ≥
9
19µa for all i ∈ [n]. This will prove the stated claim.
By reindexing, we can assume that the good ĝ (which uniquely satisfies va(ĝ) ≥ τ/19) belongs to
the first bundle P ∗1 . Hence, via the definition of v̂a, we get v̂a(P
∗
i ) = va(P
∗
i ) ≥ µa for all indices i ∈
{2, 3, . . . , n}. In addition, the lemma assumptions ensure that v̂a({g}) = va({g}) < τ/19 ≤ µa/19 for all
g ∈ G \ {ĝ}.
Using the property that all the goods in the bundle P ∗2 ⊆ G \ {ĝ} have small marginals, we will next
show that these exists a subset S ⊂ P ∗2 such that v̂a(P
∗
1 ∪ S) ≥
9
19µa and v̂a(P
∗
2 \ S) ≥
9
19µa. Setting
P ′1 = P
∗
1 ∪ S, P
′
2 = P
∗
2 \ S, and P
′
i = P
∗
i , for all i > 2, gives us the desired partition P
′ = (P ′1, . . . , P
′
n).
We iteratively remove goods from P ∗2 (in an arbitrary order) until the total value of the removed
goods exceeds 1019µa. Write S ∪ {gℓ} to denote the set of removed goods, here gℓ is the last good drawn
from P ∗2 . This procedure ensures va(S ∪ {gℓ}) ≥
10
19µa and va(S) <
10
19µa. The submodularity of va
gives us va(S) + va({gℓ}) ≥ va(S ∪ {gℓ}). Since va({gℓ}) < µa/19, we get v̂a(S) = va(S) ≥
9
19µa. The
monotonicity of v̂a (Lemma 14) establishes the stated bound for P
∗
1 ∪ S, i.e., v̂a(P
∗
1 ∪ S) ≥ v̂a(S) ≥
9
19µa.
We have an analogous bound for P ∗2 \ S. Specifically,
v̂a(P
∗
2 \ S) = va(P
∗
2 \ S)
≥ va(P
∗
2 )− va(S) (va is submodular)
≥ µa −
10
19
µa =
9
19
µa
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Therefore, the partition P ′ = (P ∗1 ∪ S,P
∗
2 \ S,P
∗
3 , . . . , P
∗
n) certifies that the maximin share under v̂a is at
least 919µa. ⊓⊔
Lemma 16 states that in Algorithm 3, as long as the the input threshold, τa, for agent a satisfies
τa ≤ µa (and independent of the relation between τb and µb, for any other agent b) the bundles obtained
for agent a approximately satisfy the MMS requirement.
Lemma 16. For an input instance I = 〈A,G, {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 (with monotone, nonnegative, and submodular
valuations) and thresholds {τa}a∈A\{n}, let partition P = (P1, P2, ..., Pn) and mapping σ : [n − 1] 7→ [n] be
the output of Algorithm 3. If for an agent a the input threshold is at most the maximin share (τa ≤ µa), then the
following inequalities hold: va(Pa) ≥
1
19τa and va(Pσ(a)) ≥
1
19τa.
Proof Write Ah to denote the set of agents a who reserve a single good of “high value” (i.e., va({ga}) ≥
τa/19) during the while-loop (Steps 2 to 4) of Algorithm 3. We index the agents in order they receive a
bundle in the algorithm. In particular, agents in Ah have a lower index than all the remaining agents
in the set [n − 1] \ Ah (who are allocated a bundle in Step 13). Note that each agent a ∈ Ah marks one
more good g′a of high value (which always exists, by the definition of Ah) in the remaining set of goods
G. Therefore, for each a ∈ Ah there exists a bundle of higher index which contains g
′
a and in Step 15 we
set σ(a) to be the index this bundle. Therefore, for each agent a ∈ Ah, we have σ(a) > a, va(Pa) ≥ τa/19,
and va(Pσ(a)) ≥ τa/19; the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of va. This ensures that the
required inequalities hold for each agent a ∈ Ah. The remainder of the proof shows that the output of
the algorithm satisfies analogous inequalities for the remaining agents A = {A \ {n}} \ Ah.
In particular, write A to denote the set of agents left after the preprocessing performed in the while-
loop (Steps 2 to 4) and G be the corresponding set of remaining goods. As in Step 5, write A′ to denote
the set of agents a ∈ A with exactly one high-valued good ga ∈ G (i.e., with exactly one good ga ∈ G
with the property that va({ga}) ≥ τa/19.) Note that the algorithm considers a surrogate valuation v̂a for
each a ∈ A′, and for the remaining agents (in A \A′) the valuation remains unchanged.
With set of agents A, indivisible goods G, and valuations v̂as, the algorithm considers an MMS in-
stance I ′ in Step 8, i.e., I ′ = 〈A,G, {v̂a}a∈A〉.
Note that themaximin share, µ∗a, of an agent a ∈ A in the instancewith true valuations, 〈A,G, {va}a∈A〉,
is at least as large as µa.
15 Specifically, the inequality µ∗a ≥ µa, follows from the fact that the algo-
rithm removes |Ah| agents and exactly |Ah| goods from the input instance I . Therefore, if partition
B = (B1, . . . , Bn) induces the maximin share µa in I , then removing the goods allocated to agents in Ah
still leaves n− |Ah| > |A| bundles in B that are contained in G and are of value at least µa.
Since µa ≤ µ
∗
a, Lemma 16 (applied to instance 〈A,G, {va}a∈A〉) gives us µ̂a ≥
9
19µ
∗
a ≥
9
19µa, here µ̂a
is the maximin share of agent a in the constructed instance I ′ = 〈A,G, {v̂a}a∈A〉.
16 This inequality and
the 1/3-approximation guarantee in [GHS+18] ensure that if τa ≤ µa, then the bundle Qa computed for
agent a satisfies v̂a(Qa) ≥
1
3 µ̂a ≥
3
19µa ≥
3
19τa. Note that the contrapositive version of this assertion
gives the test for τa in Step 10: if va(Qa) <
3
19τa, then it must be the case that τa > µa.
Next, using the lemma assumption that τa ≤ µa and the property of the surrogate valuations, we will
show that Qa can be always be partitioned into subsets Q
′
a and Qa \ Q
′
a such that v̂a(Q
′
a) ≥ τa/19 and
v̂a(Qa \Q
′
a) ≥ τa/19. In particular, for an agent a ∈ A, we iteratively remove goods from bundle Qa (in
an arbitrary order) until the total value of the removed goods exceeds 219τa. WriteQ
′
a∪{gk} to denote the
set of removed goods, here gk is the last good drawn from Qa. This procedure ensures v̂a(Q
′
a ∪ {gk}) ≥
2
19τa and v̂a(Q
′
a) <
2
19τa. The submodularity of v̂a gives us v̂a(Q
′
a) + v̂a({gk}) ≥ v̂a(Q
′
a ∪ {gk}). Since
the definition of surrogate function v̂a ensures that v̂a({gk}) ≤ τa/19, the following inequality holds
v̂a(Q
′
a) ≥
1
19τa.
In addition, via the submodularity of v̂a, we have v̂a(Q
′
a) + v̂a(Qa \ Q
′
a) ≥ v̂a(Qa) ≥
3
19τa. That is,
v̂a(Qa \Q
′
a) ≥
1
19τa.
15µ∗a is obtained by maximizing over |A|-partitions of the setG, with respect to the valuation va.
16µ̂a is obtained by maximizing over |A|-partitions of the setG, with respect to the valuation v̂a.
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The fact that the algorithm successfully executes till Step 13 establishes the required property for the
allocation Pa = Q
′
a assigned to agent a ∈ A: va(Pa) ≥ v̂a(Pa) ≥ τa/19. Furthermore, va(Pn) ≥ v̂a(Pn) ≥
v̂a(Qa\Q
′
a) ≥ τa/19; here the second inequality follows from the monotonicity of v̂a. Since the algorithm
sets σ(a) = n for all a ∈ A, we get the stated bounds: σ(a) > a, va(Pa) ≥
1
19τa and va(Pσ(a)) ≥
1
19τa for
all a ∈ A. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
We finally prove the main result of this section which shows that a secretive 119 -MMS allocation can
be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 7. Let I = 〈A,G, {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 be a fair division instance with indivisible goods, G, and a secretive
agent. If the valuations {va}a∈A\{n} are nonnegative, monotone, and submodular, then a secretive 1/19-MMS
allocation P = (P1, P2, ..., Pn) for I is guaranteed to exist and such an approximate MMS allocation can be
computed in polynomial time.
Proof We will use Algorithm 3 in conjunction with a binary search to obtain the stated approxima-
tion guarantee. In particular, Lemma 16 ensures that Algorithm 3 successfully terminates if all the
input thresholds are at most the maximin shares of the respective agents and, otherwise, it correctly
identifies/flags all agents a for whom τa > µa. Therefore, we can start with large enough values for
the thresholds and perform a binary search to approximately find the largest possible thresholds un-
der which Algorithm 3 succeeds in finding a partition which satisfies the required 1/19-approximation
guarantee–note that the correctness of themethod (in particular, the execution of binary search) critically
relies on the fact that Algorithm 3 never flags an agent a with τa ≤ µa.
Since Algorithm 3 runs in polynomial time, the time complexity of the overall binary search is also
polynomial. Therefore, we can efficiently find a partition P = (P1, P2, .., Pn) of the indivisible goods G
along with a mapping σ such that for each agent a ∈ A \ {n} we have va(Pa) ≥ µa/19 and va(Pσ(a)) ≥
µa/19. Furthermore, with our re-indexing of agents (in the order in which they receive goods), we get
that σ(a) > a for all agents a ∈ A\{n}. Therefore, using Lemma 1, we can construct n bijections {πk}k∈[n]
which will guarantee—for every possible choice Pk of the secretive agent—to each agent a bundle of
value at least 1/19 times her maximin share. In other words, the computed partition (P1, . . . , Pn) is a
secretive 1/19-MMS solution. ⊓⊔
An improved approximation guarantee can be achieved for special subclasses of submodular func-
tions, such as additive functions. We show that a secretive 1/2-MMS allocations for additive valuations
can be computed in polynomial time in Appendix A.
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A Secretive 1/2-MMS Allocations Under Additive Valuations
This section presents a polynomial-time algorithm (Algorithm 4), based on a discrete moving knife
procedure, for computing secretive 1/2-MMS solutions under additive valuations.
Given a fair division instance 〈A,G, {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 with a secretive agent, m indivisible goods, and
additive valuations.17 Write µa to denote the maximin share of agent a over the set of goods G; see
Equation (1).
For every (non-secretive) agent a ∈ A \ {n}, we employ Woeginger’s PTAS [Woe97] to compute a
threshold τa that satisfies (1 − ε)µa ≤ τa ≤ µa, for a small enough ε. We execute Algorithm 4 with these
thresholds, τas, as input.
17Recall that a valuation function v : 2G 7→ R+, over a set of indivisible goods G, is said to be additive iff for every subset
A ⊆ G we have v(A) =
∑
g∈A
v(g), where v(g) is the value of good g ∈ G.
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Algorithm 4 Computation of 1/2-secretive MMS solution under additive valuations
Input: A fair division instance I = 〈A = [n],G = [m], {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 with a secretive agent and additive
valuations along with thresholds {τa}a∈A\{n} that satisfy τa ≤ µa.
Output: An allocation (P1, . . . , Pn) and a mapping σ : [n− 1] 7→ [n] such that va(Pa) ≥ τa/2, va(Pσ(a)) ≥
τa/2, and σ(a) > a for all a ∈ A \ {n}.
1: Initialize set of agents A = [n− 1] and set of goodsG = [m].
2: while there exist agent a ∈ A and good g ∈ G such that va(g) ≥ τa/2 do
3: Allocate Pa ← {g}, and update A← A \ {a} and G← G \ {g}.
4: end while
5: while A 6= ∅ do
6: Arrange the goods in G in an arbitrary order, g1, g2, . . . , g|G|
7: For each agent b ∈ A, let ℓb denote the minimum index such that vb({g1, g2, . . . , gℓb}) ≥ τb/2
{We will prove that such an index ℓb < |G| always exists}
8: Select agent a ∈ argminb∈A ℓb.
9: Assign Pa = {g1, g2, . . . , gℓa}
10: Update A← A \ {a} and G← G \ {g1, g2, . . . , gℓa}
11: end while
12: Set Pn = G.
13: Index the agents in order they receive a bundle in the algorithm and for each agent a ∈ [n − 1] find
a bundle Pa′ such that a
′ > a and va(Pa′) ≥ τa/2. Set σ(a) = a
′.
{We will prove that such a higher-index bundle exists for each agent}
14: return partition P = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) and mapping σ.
Theorem 17. For every fair division instance I = 〈A,G, {va}a∈A\{n} 〉 with a secretive agent and additive
valuations, a secretive 12 -MMS solution exists and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof As in Algorithm 4, we index the agents in the same order in which they receive a bundle in the
algorithm. Write Ah to denote the set of agents that receive a single good of high value (i.e., of value
at least τa/2) in the preprocessing round (Step 3) of the algorithm. Denote the set of goods assigned
to agents in this round as Gh. Note that |Ah| = |Gh| and let r := n − 1 − |Ah| denote the number of
remaining non-secretive agents that receive a bundle during the second while-loop of the algorithm.
The above-mentioned reindexing ensures that Ah = {1, 2, . . . , n− 1− r}.
Note that for any agent a ∈ A\{n}, the maximin share restricted to (r+1) agents and the set of goods
G \Gh is at least as large as µa. Specifically, if maximin share µ
∗
a is obtained by maximizing over (r+1)-
partitions of the set G \Gh, with respect to the valuation va, then µ
∗
a ≥ µa. This follows from considering
an n-partition (B1, B2, . . . , Bn) of G that induces the maximin share, i.e., va(Bi) ≥ µa for all i ∈ [n]. Since
we are removing n − r − 1 = |Gh| goods and an equal number of agents from consideration, there will
exist (r+1) bundles, Bis, that are contained in G \Gh. In order words, G \Gh admits an (r+1)-partition
in which each bundle is of value at least µa, i.e., we have µ
∗
a ≥ µa. Recall that the input threshold τa is at
most the maximin share, hence µ∗a ≥ τa.
Next, we will show that Steps 7 and 13 in the algorithm always succeed. This in turn implies that the
algorithm returns a partition P = (P1, . . . , Pn) along with a mapping σ, which satisfies the conditions
in Lemma 1. Hence, we get that Algorithm 4 finds a secretive 1/2-MMS solution.
Since the valuations of all the agents a ∈ [n − 1] are additive, we have va(G\Gh)
r+1 ≥ µ
∗
a ≥ τa. That
is, for every agent a the following bound holds va(G \ Gh) ≥ (r + 1)τa. Hence, at the beginning of
the second while-loop (in Step 7), for every agent a ∈ [n − 1] \ Ah, there exists an index ℓa such that
va({g1, g2, . . . , gℓa}) ≥ τa/2.
We will inductively prove that this property continues to hold, i.e., in any iteration of the second
while-loop, if A and G are the set of remaining agents and goods, respectively, then for all a ∈ A we
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have va(G) ≥ τa. This will imply that in Step 7 for every remaining agent b ∈ A we have a well-defined
index ℓb. Let P(1), P(2), . . . , P(t) be the set of bundles allocated in the first t iterations of the second while-
loop. For a remaining agent a ∈ A, we have va(P(s)) ≤ τa, for 1 ≤ s ≤ t. This follows, from the fact that,
for agent a, a (strict) subset of P(s) with one less good, say P(s) \ {gℓ}, was of value strictly less than τa/2
(else, awould have been selected in Step 8). The preprocessing performed in the algorithm ensures that,
for all agents in A and goods g ∈ G, we have va(g) ≤ τa/2. Hence, va(P(s)) = va(P(s) \ {gℓ})+ va({gℓ}) ≤
τa/2 + τa/2. Recall that va(G \ Gh) ≥ (r + 1)τa. Therefore, in iteration t ≤ r, for the set of remaining
goods,G = G \
(
Gh ∪ (∪
t
s=1P(s))
)
, the required bound holds, va(G) ≥ (r + 1− t)τa.
These observations ensure that the algorithm successfully associates with each agent a ∈ [n − 1] a
bundle Pa with the property that va(Pa) ≥ τa/2.
To complete the proof we will show that the algorithm also succeeds in Step 13. As mentioned
previously, for every agent a ∈ [n − 1] we have µ∗a ≥ µa. Consider an agent a ∈ Ah and note that for a’s
additive valuation we have va(G\Gh)
r+1 ≥ µ
∗
a. The set of goods G \Gh gets partitioned into (r + 1) bundles
Pn−r, . . . , Pn that satisfy
∑n
s=n−r va(Ps) = va(G \Gh). By an averaging argument, we get that there exists
an index a′ ≥ n − r > a such that va(Pa′) ≥ µ
∗
a ≥ τa. That is, for all a ∈ Ah, the a
′ required in Step 13
exists.18
In the complementary case we consider agents a /∈ Ah. Let t denote the iteration (of the secondwhile-
loop) in which agent a is processed. If G is the set of goods that remain unassigned at the beginning of
iteration t, then (via the argumentsmentioned previously)we have va(G) ≥ (r+1−t−1)τa. Furthermore,
note that va(Pa) ≤ τa; again, this is a consequence of preprocessing away the high-valued goods. The
set of goods left after processing a is G \Pa and for a the value of these goods va(G \Pa) ≥ (r+1− t)τa.
The algorithm creates r + 1 − t bundles from these goods (including Pn). Therefore, for a, one of these
later-created bundles is guaranteed to be of value at least τa. Hence, for agents a ∈ [n − 1] \ Ah as well,
we get that the index a′—required to construct mapping σ in Step 13—always exists.
Overall, by applying Lemma 1 on the mapping σ, we can construct the appropriate bijections that
prove that the returned partition P is a secretive 1/2-MMS solution. This completes the proof.
⊓⊔
Remark: It is possible to bypass the application of Woeginger’s PTAS by employing a binary-search
method (similar to the one used in Section 6.2). However, we have used the PTAS here for ease of
exposition and analysis.
B Proof of Lemma 14
In this section we prove that transformation detailed in Equation 4 preserves submodularity and mono-
tonicity.
Lemma 14. Let v : 2G 7→ R+ be a monotone increasing, nonnegative, submodular valuation function over a set
of indivisible goods G. If for a parameter κ > 0, there exists exactly one good ĝ ∈ G such that v({ĝ}) ≥ κ, then
the valuation function v̂ : 2G 7→ R+, obtained using Equation (4) with good ĝ and threshold κ, is also monotone
increasing, nonnegative, and submodular.
Proof Write v to denote the initial submodular function and v̂ be the transformed function. We will
prove that v̂ is also submodular; in particular, we will establish that for any pair of subsets, A,B ⊆ G,
the following inequality holds v̂(A) + v̂(B) ≥ v̂(A ∪ B) + v̂(A ∩ B). The proof relies on analyzing the
following cases, which depend upon the containment of the good ĝ, with respect to the sets A and B.
18Of course, such an a′ can be found efficiently by enumeration.
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Case I: Good ĝ /∈ A ∪B
v̂(A) + v̂(B) = v(A) + v(B) (since, ĝ /∈ A ∪B)
≥ v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) (by submodularity of v)
= v̂(A ∪B) + v̂(A ∩B) (since ĝ /∈ A ∪B)
Case II: Good ĝ ∈ A \B
v̂(A) + v̂(B) = v(A \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vA\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
+ v(B) (since ĝ ∈ A and ĝ /∈ B)
≥ v(A \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, v(A∪B)\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
+ v(B) (by submodularity of v)
≥ v((A ∪B) \ {ĝ}) + v(A ∩B) + min
{
κ, v(A∪B)\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
(by submodularity of v)
= v((A ∪B) \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, v(A∪B)\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
+ v(A ∩B)
= v̂(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) (by the definition of v̂)
= v̂(A ∪B) + v̂(A ∩B) (ĝ /∈ A ∩B)
Case III: Good ĝ ∈ B \A: Identical to Case II
Case IV: Good ĝ ∈ A ∩B
There are four subcases based on the value of κ relative to vA\{ĝ}(ĝ) and vB\{ĝ}(ĝ).
Subcase (i): vA\{ĝ}(ĝ), vB\{ĝ}(ĝ) ≤ κ
v̂(A) + v̂(B) = v(A \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vA\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
+ v(B \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vB\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
(by definition of v̂)
= v(A \ {ĝ}) + vA\{ĝ}(ĝ) + v(B \ {ĝ}) + vB\{ĝ}(ĝ) (since vA\{ĝ}(ĝ), vB\{ĝ}(ĝ) ≤ κ)
= v(A) + v(B)
≥ v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) (by submodularity of v)
= v((A ∪B) \ {ĝ}) + v(A∪B)\{ĝ}(ĝ) + v((A ∩B) \ {ĝ}) + v(A∩B)\{ĝ}(ĝ)
≥ v((A ∪B) \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, v(A∪B)\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
+ v((A ∩B) \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, v(A∩B)\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
= v̂(A ∪B) + v̂(A ∩B) (since ĝ ∈ A and ĝ ∈ B)
Subcase (ii): vA\{ĝ}(ĝ) ≥ κ and vB\{ĝ}(ĝ) ≤ κ
v̂(A) + v̂(B) = v(A \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vA\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
+ v(B \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vB\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
(since ĝ ∈ A and ĝ ∈ B)
= v(A \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vA\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
+ v(B \ {ĝ}) + vB\{ĝ}(ĝ) (since, vB\{ĝ}(ĝ) ≤ κ)
≥ v((A ∪B) \ {ĝ}) + v((A ∩B) \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vA\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
+ vB\{ĝ}(ĝ)
(by submodularity of v)
= v((A ∪B) \ {ĝ}) + v((A ∩B) \ {ĝ}) + κ+ vB\{ĝ}(ĝ) (since vA\{ĝ}(ĝ) ≥ κ)
= v((A ∪B) \ {ĝ}) + v((A ∩B) \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, v(A∩B)\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
+ vB\{ĝ}(ĝ)
(since v(A∩B)\{ĝ}(ĝ) ≥ vA\{ĝ}(ĝ) ≥ κ)
≥ v((A ∪B) \ {ĝ}) + v((A ∩B) \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, v(A∩B)\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
+min
{
κ, v(A∪B)\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
(submodularity of v)
= v̂(A ∪B) + v̂(A ∩B) (since ĝ ∈ A and ĝ ∈ B)
Subcase (iii): vA\{ĝ}(ĝ) ≤ κ and vB\{ĝ}(ĝ) ≥ κ: Identical to Subcase (ii)
Subcase (iv): vA\{ĝ}(ĝ), vB\{ĝ}(ĝ) < κ
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v̂(A) + v̂(B) = v(A \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vA\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
+ v(B \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vB\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
(since g ∈ A and g ∈ B)
= v(A \ {ĝ}) + v(A)\{ĝ}(ĝ) + v(B \ {ĝ}) + vB\{ĝ}(ĝ)
= v(A) + v(B)
≥ v(A ∪B) + v(A ∩B) (by submodularity of v)
= v((A ∪B) \ {ĝ}) + v(A∪B)\{ĝ}(ĝ) + v((A ∩B) \ {ĝ}) + v(A∩B)\{ĝ}(ĝ)
= v((A ∪B) \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, v(A∪B)\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
+ v((A ∩B) \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, v(A∩B)\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
= v̂(A ∪B) + v̂(A ∩B) (by definition of v̂)
This shows that submodularity is preserved when we transform v to v̂.
For monotonicity, we will show that v̂(A∪{h}) ≥ v̂(A) for all subsetsA ⊆ G and for all goods h ∈ G.
Note that the claim is trivial when h ∈ A, since in this case A ∪ {h} = A. Therefore, for the remainder of
the proof we will focus on cases wherein h /∈ A.
We have four cases to consider based on the containment of good ĝ inA and whether or not the good
h is the same as ĝ.
Case I: Good ĝ /∈ A and ĝ 6= h.
v̂(A ∪ {h}) = v(A ∪ {h}) (since ĝ /∈ A ∪ {h} )
≥ v(A) (by monotonicity of v)
= v̂(A) (since ĝ /∈ A )
Case II: Good ĝ ∈ A and ĝ = h.
Note that in this case h ∈ A and, hence, the required inequality holds directly.
Case III: Good ĝ /∈ A and ĝ = h.
Here, the required inequality reduces to v̂(A ∪ {ĝ}) ≥ v̂(A). Since ĝ /∈ A, we have
v̂(A ∪ {ĝ}) = v(A) + min {κ, vA(ĝ)} (by definition of v̂)
≥ v(A) (since, min {κ, vA(ĝ)} ≥ 0 )
= v̂(A) (since ĝ /∈ A )
Case IV: Good ĝ ∈ A and ĝ 6= h.
In this case, first we express v̂(A ∪ {h}) and v̂(A) using the definition of v̂:
v̂(A ∪ {h}) = v((A \ {ĝ}) ∪ {h}) + min
{
κ, v(A\{ĝ})∪{h}(ĝ)
}
v̂(A) = v(A \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vA\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
Subcase (i): v(A\{ĝ})∪{h}(ĝ) ≥ κ
v̂(A ∪ {h}) = v((A \ {ĝ}) ∪ {h}) + min
{
κ, v(A\{ĝ})∪{h}(ĝ)
}
= v((A \ {ĝ}) ∪ {h}) + κ
≥ v(A \ {ĝ}) + κ (by monotonicity of v)
= v(A \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vA\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
(vA\{ĝ}(ĝ) ≥ v(A\{ĝ})∪{h}(ĝ) ≥ κ)
= v̂(A)
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Subcase (ii): v(A\{ĝ})∪{h}(ĝ) < κ
v̂(A ∪ {h}) = v((A \ {ĝ}) ∪ {h}) + min
{
κ, v(A\{ĝ})∪{h}(ĝ)
}
= v((A \ {ĝ}) ∪ {h}) + v(A\{ĝ})∪{h}(ĝ)
= v(A ∪ {h})
≥ v(A) (by monotonicity of v)
= v(A \ {ĝ}) + vA\{ĝ}(ĝ)
≥ v(A \ {ĝ}) + min
{
κ, vA\{ĝ}(ĝ)
}
= v̂(A)
⊓⊔
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